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There has been much debate on the interface between protection by technological protection measures and substantive copyright law. DRM’s such technological protection measures (hereinafter: TPM) afford absolute protection to information, functioning as a code to distinguish exclusion and inclusion. Normative rules endorsing and, indeed, supporting their application can hardly co-exist with a normative system that allocates rights only where certain clear conditions are met. It will be argued here that regulating TPM’s as a means of enforcing copyright law is misguided, shifting the debate towards topoi relating exclusively to copyright as a system protecting individual creativity against what may roughly be identified as a public domain topos. This risks missing the fundamental distinction between protecting market interests in general and protecting individual works of authorship. 

Articles 11 of the World Copyright Treaty, for example, limits TPM protection to measures “used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights […] in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.” In Europe, some member states have tentatively clarified that TPM protection should not override basic freedoms as guaranteed in sustained copyright law, whereas others have opted for an absolute protection. That debate highlight the specific difficulties that protection of information, generally, faces when confronted with specific legal sub-systems and regulatory areas. 

However, there are serious doubts as to whether a simplistic notion of some nexus between infringement of TPM’s and substantive freedom in copyright truly achieves a satisfactory legal regime. Dogmatically, copyright is highly differentiated. The mechanisms by which the legal distinction can be made are numerous and differ as between individual jurisdictions, most notably the copyright and droit d’auteur systems. The EU response to the underlying goal conflict was regulated only to the extent that certain statutory limitations may be declared as enforceable, thus offering beneficiaries a pathway to dedicated but different procedural dispute resolution mechanisms. Where a copyright nexus approach has been advocated, this suggests – though this is by no means conclusive – that copyright limitations not declared as potentially enforceable at the national level remain unenforceable as a  defence to acts by which TPM’s are circumvented. In a similar vein, issues pertaining to non-protectable or merely partially protected material arise, and similarly they arise where an individual circumvents for purposes of non-infringing acts – such as simply reading the contents of a work shielded by code​[1]​. These concerns arise, initially, only in as far as individuals circumvent, but create numerous dogmatic difficulties and inconsistencies with the overall copyright system, including a danger that the sheer presence of legal (rather than purely technical) protection of TPM’s allows, circuitously, the incremental incorporation of a notions of truly extended control rights- a general access privilege as an element of copyright on a substantive level. Additionally, the recent decision of the European Court of Justice in Infopaq​[2]​ concerning the effects of transient copies – which necessarily occur whenever a work is subject to digital treatment – further complicates any meaningful application of a principled ‘copyright nexus’ doctrine concept. There is a danger in that debate itself which risks missing the prospect for a future formulation that might allow a clearer conceptual definition of the rationale on which TPM protection is to be based vis-à-vis conflicting interests. These interests are not monolithically definable public domain interests as formulated, predominantly, in statutory chapters on copyright limitations or defences. They cover broader facets of how human rights are enforceable, how market interests are to be identified and balanced, and how contract and consumer law impact on the scope of such rights.       

As will be demonstrated, both the density of normative rules affording protection and the general spirit of the Directive as a mechanism that predominantly aims at a high level of exploiter’s protection render such principle inconsequential. In general, the inconsistencies – and irresolvable – goal conflicts raise serious issues as to how legal TPM should be rationalised. As will be seen, copyright law can only very patchily afford such rationale, and the complex manner in which specifically a copyright nexus approach would work is testament to this. A code protects digital information irrespective of the type of legal protection, if any, is afforded, and this initially establishes a supremacy of TPM’s over substantive law​[3]​.  It will be argued that re-conceptualising the underlying rationale would result in a clearer dogmatic systematisation allowing, in turn, meaningful legal evolution. 

The intricacies of construing TPM protection as a means of copyright enforcement illustrated here reveal that the apparent normative hierarchy presupposed by Article 6 – where the individual act of circumvention is represented as a principal tort to which the core normative prohibition vis-à-vis commercially disseminating (and profiting from) circumvention applies as some form of contributory copyright infringement rule – is misguided. The core regulatory function lies in the latter. It is a means to prevent the misappropriation of market interests. Hence, the legal relationship regulated concerns the conflict of interests between those providing services and those offering technologies enabling bypassing control mechanisms. If so, this raises serious doubts about the need of the law to comprise a normative prohibition applicable vis-à-vis individual consumers.      
 
In the copyright context, thus, much of the recent debate was devoted to establishing norms and principles allowing some co-existence between TPM protection and substantive copyright, but many decisions were indeed concerned with scenarios not governed precisely under the wording of Article 6(2).  As will be shown, where the digital use of works is concerned, it is almost impossible to escape a notion of infringement, specifically with regard to the density of protection that was afforded under the 2001 Directive. Still, to some extent the scope of protection afforded to TPM’s is contingent upon the existence and scope of copyright. 
B.	The Directive and the Matrix of Interests
The following will provide an overview of Article 6 in the context of the overall protective approach of the Directive. Detecting its spirit is not too difficult. The recitals state that a high level of protection, coupled with the ease of replication, and driven by traditional considerations of efficiency in economic terms, is intended by the Directive, and it is that programme that creates the axiomatic backdrop. Article 6(1) of the EUCD​[4]​ prohibits the circumvention of applied and effective technological protection measures, in most national laws as a form of protection based on computer code that is deemed to complement exclusive right enjoyed under substantive copyright law. Thereby, the use of TPM’s is regulated as type of enforcement that complements these rights rather than introduces a sole standing right of access​[5]​. It would follow that establishing some nexus between circumvention of TPM’s and substantive copyright protection must be shown in order in order to establish a violation of the TPM rules. Where the object of protection thus is constituted to be interests safeguarded by normative copyright principles, TPM’s themselves are unable to fully reflect the traditional flexibility inherent in normative copyright law​[6]​. That conflict between normativity and technical code can, it would appear, be solved by employing the copyright nexus principle​[7]​. Accordingly, for acts covered under Article 6(1), an eventual violation – i.e. the commitment of an act restricted by copyright law – must be shown.

Article 6 must be understood in the context of the overall hierarchy of norms protection predominantly commercial interests. The Directive makes no express distinction as to these interests. It frequently equates author’s interests with the interests of right holders, thus leaving it very much open whether protection is based on fostering business interests, ideational interests or both. Durch diese zweigelisgkeit wird es schwer zu sagen welche interesse tatseachlich geschuetzt sind was zu einer dogmatischen sxchifelage und einer blibigkeit fuehrt.

Indeed, the Directive affords almost complete protection to online business models, in relation to which limitations cannot be enforced, a legislative decision much in line with the overall conviction of the Commission that copyright is but a means to foster immediate contractual relationship between exploiters and consumers. In that sense, copyright is afforded a status as a proprietary vehicle through which business interests can be enforced vis-à-vis consumers.  A somewhat weaker protection is afforded to the remaining instances where TPM’s have been employed, and here much depends on the strength of the copyright nexus argument at last as far as the prohibition against acts of individual circumvention is concerned. These issues are entirely left to member states. Whether TPM protection is absolute or not thus depends on the dogmatic classification of the norms affording protection to the code. It is, arguably, only in the vicinity of Article 6(4) that a means exists to enforce limitations, though Article 6(4) is limited predominatly to limitations and exceptions applying to institutional uses. Given that such uses would usually require the payment of an equitable remuneration to authors, there is a certain conflict of interests in case where TPM’s are used to block such institutional uses; it may well be argued that where TPM’s allow for direct marketing​[8]​, the limitation in question is not enforceable as such. Indeed, the Directive is based on voluntary agreements entered into between bnefiiaris and right holders and does not permit to exercise any limitation without entering into some type of dispute resolution mechanism. 

The upshot here is that again exploiters’ interests receive a level of protection that eventually surpasses even the requirement of an equitable remuneration payable to authors, which as a general rule would indeed support the tendency of buyout contracts. Article 6(4) may, thus, be engaged in such cases allowing to enforce certain limitations though this clearly is subject to contractual stipulations for payment to right holders. Evidently, it does not allow member states to permit individual users or institutions self help. In addition, at the level of substantive copyright law, the status of limitations is per se rather inadequate. In most cases concerning digital uses, member states may only allow limitations where the use is made by a natural person. Overall, this would exclude the ability of third parties to offer value added services, arguably obstructing judicial attempts to regulate competition on after markets on the basis of an ‘agency’ argument on which such services might otherwise rely​[9]​. Further, the position is complicated by the presence of the three step test in Article 5(5), covering Article 5(2) (concerning limitations on the reproduction rights) and 5(3) (concerning both acts of copying and communication to the public). Thereby, Article 5(5) may further infuse a notion of protection when national courts are faced with the task of applying existing limitations to new digital phenomena. Finally, the conceptual rigidity with which exploiter’s interests are protected is exacerbated especially through affording extensive exclusive rights, covering – importantly – nearly all temporary copies, and thereby every imaginable use in the course of an act of circumvention. At this stage, the dogmatic structure becomes arbitrary, even where a copyright nexus is proposed. Where normative extensions to the existing exclusive rights afford a virtual use and access control right, the much debated link between substantive principles and code control will at best have a hypothetical appeal. 

It is apparent that where such nexus is suggested its scope depends on how the Directive is interpreted before national courts, both as regards the construction of its substantive provsions, but more importantly how the Directive is understood as a regulatory means in general. Critically, the lack of an express assertion of protectionist rationales likely leads to arbitrary choices in individual cases. The Directive emphasises the abstract right rather than the creation. A copyright system that in truth axiomatically focuses on the ability of a property right as an asset allowing business transactions rather than on protecting of the individual creation risks a loss of informed decision making.  At present, the trite observation can be made that the effects of TPM protection are unknown because of a lack of workable first principles. Hence, rationalizing TPM protection depends on the effects one thinks are desirable. In turn, this is content upon predominantly economic considerations, which the European lawmaker clearly assumes to occur where a ‘high level of protection’ is granted. Proof of welfare advantages is presently absent. This is not suspiring because a multitude of actors may claim, legitimately, interests in aces and use to digital works, for both commercial and non-commercial reasons.  How these different interests must, in general, be balanced is complicated by the fact that digital technology is exceedingly dynamic. These dynamics raise serious issues of how future use modalities should be allocated beause they give rise to a diverse range of interests​[10]​. The conceptual architecture present in the Directive – which monolithically contrasts exploiters’ and consumers’ interests – is certainly inapt to fully grasp how these interests should be balanced​[11]​. The occurrence of general public welfare benefits is, therefore, axiomatically contingent upon whether permitting strong control over information through using TPM’s leads to better choice and general availability of information services. 
C.	General Rationales of TPM Protection 
TPM protection is a general challenge to the law because of its ability to exclude from access and use of information. Indeed, it was unfair competition law that provided a sounder – and more specific – initial protectionist rationale for TPM protection in the EU​[12]​, as is clear when considering the underlying investment protection function underscoring the conditional access rules​[13]​ and the prohibition on disseminating circumvention in relation to software copyright​[14]​. The legislative intention underlying the conditional access rules therefore concerns, broadly speaking, acts of free riding and an eventual loss of incentive to invest in online services. Thus, both Article (2) of the Conditional Access Directive and Article 7(1)(c) of the Computer Program Directive only afford protection against commercial dealings, rather than prohibiting acts of individual circumvention. In contrast to Article 6 EUCD, these rules embed a different normative model, based on leaving intact individual uses whilst allowing at least a modicum of balancing of interests. For instance, taking into account the overall desirability to provide incentives specifically under the conditional access rules – which has not, as far as can be ascertained, been tested in court – indeed allows some judicial freedom of movement in assessing whether the allegedly infringing technology has uses that go beyond impinging upon specific commercial interest. A regulatory model focussing on commercial interests thus allows, in general, some balancing on the basis of whether a particular technology allows directly free ride, or conversely whether it has certain beneficial and additional uses. Article 6(1) – presenting itself as a principal tort to which Article 6(2) is added as a type of contributory act – would barely leave such opportunity. 

There is, for the reasons mentioned, a dearth of clarity, predominantly because the Directive makes an unfounded presumption in favouring interests protected as ‘property’, versus exceptions to be construed narrowly​[15]​. Copyright law is (mis-)understood as a primary system of rules divided up into property rules complemented by narrow exception. Because substantive copyright law is highly flexible, disentangling traditional protectionist goals of copyright from a perceivable absolute control of information via TPM’s is extremely burdensome.  How such rationale allows preserving the traditionally flexible architecture that is embedded in the traditional copyright analysis: in the absence of TPM protection, courts have a variety of principles and normative functionalities at their disposal to counter balance any overprotective effect. These are abandoned once a normative principle of unrestricted protection of code is introduced. It progressively destabilises copyright law itself​[16]​. The danger, therefore, is twofold: first, the incremental adoption of notions of complete information control in copyright, in turn based on concepts of an absolute privilege to apply code protection.  

There are limits to the persuasiveness of the copyright nexus contention. These are partially attributable to the uncertainty surrounding the protectionist rationale underlying Article 6, and partially attributable to a high degree of normative rigidity. Three focal grounds account for that: first, the Directive itself contains unbendingly formulated exclusive rights, and in particular, an extensive reproduction right that applies to all forms of temporary and transient copying. Secondly, the Directive makes rather opaque provisions on the interaction between TPM protection and substantive norms, yet only as regards specifically enumerated “limitations or exceptions”, a regulatory choice that appears to pre-empt the freedom to circumvent where such act would be governed by a limitation. Thirdly, Article 6 (1) cannot be disconnected from the scope of protection against commercial dealings in circumvention devices under Article 6(2), in particular their manufacture and dissemination. Necessarily, the stricter the prohibitory effect of Article 6(2) is, the less it is likely that tools permitting circumvention for legitimate acts are factually available, rendering the debate academic at best.         

The expression ‘copyright nexus’, is understood here to mean that the act of individual circumvention should be prohibited only where it involves an eventual violation of exclusive rights​[17]​, and can be found in the preparatory parliamentary materials in most member states. The debate was arguably instigated following the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act​[18]​, where the Reimerdes decision infamously advocated an electronic fence metaphor, resulting in a notion of absolute protection of TPM’s​[19]​. The DMCA does not allow the exercise of the fair use clause​[20]​ - a defence to copyright infringement would thus not simultaneously provide a defence to acts of circumvention. Indeed, some meaningful practial solutions  – including a ‘reverse notice and take down order’​[21]​ – have been suggested to re-impose a more meaningful balance reflecting substantive copyright law in the US. Countries outside the EU have similarly established such nexus​[22]​. However, the EU stance has, from the outset, been limited. Article 6(4) regulates the interaction between certain limitations and TPM protection, the details of which have been left to member states. Outside of the ambit of Article 6(4), the dogmatics of how substantive copyright law and TPM protection may co-exist is largely open. As will be seen, the debate appears to have rather limited practical significance. 
D.	Copyright Topoi in TPM protection
In traditional copyright law, public domain considerations are incorporated by employing different legislative and dogmatic means​[23]​. General principles such as the freedom of information and the freedom to enjoy a work may be classed as fundamental principles of copyright, whereas liberties that are more detailed are dealt with under the limitations or defences heading. Dogmatically, the copyright nexus principle may apply in each of these categories. However, the practical impact may be limited. First, it should be mentioned that the applicability of that principle depends on whether an absolute normative access right is advocated, which should not further be discussed here​[24]​. Secondly, the dogmatic construction of a “right to circumvent” depends the interpretation of Article 5(1) (dealing with exceptions to transient reproductions) and the proper construction of Article 6(4), that is, the only provision (Article 6(4)) dealing with the more general interface between the two protection models, allowing member states to render such limitations enforceable following a prescribed procedure​[25]​.  However, if legislators are to seriously retain a complete nexus between copyright and code control, a number of subsequent issues come into view. This is because in the absence of TPM protection copyright law neither discourages from viewing or reading, it allows activities like quotations​[26]​ or citations and does not afford protection to information even where such information is part of an original database. It is, for instance, by no means certain that a TPM is legally protected where it blocks access to mere data, or where circumvention is carried out in order to gain access to underlying information or ideas embedded in a work. Similarly, a notion of a copyright nexus requires an analysis of the status of transient copies made in the course of acts of circumvention, a problem now further accelerated after the ruling of the European Court of Justice in Infopaq​[27]​. Further scrutiny is also needed as regards the status and general interpretation of Article 6(4) concerning the enforceability of limitations, a provision remaining utterly silent on its true scope, arguably forcing courts to a categorical identification of acts covered as (mere) limitations or as uses that axiomatically do not infringe. Hence, in various scenarios, it becomes clear that courts now have to make decisions that are doctrinally unsound. 

I.	Acts of Circumvention: Selected „Public Domain“ Scenarios
Relevant scenarios affecting Article 6(1) may be distinguished according to the following  categories:

	Absence of any copyright protection​[28]​
	Presence of copyright protection but absence of infringing uses following acts of circumvention​[29]​.
	Presence of uses that constitute a reproduction but that are generally permitted (quotations, citations, parodies, “free uses” etc.) 
	Uses otherwise governed and permitted by a limitation under national law (such as the making of copies for private purposes).

The first category concerns certain uses that enable access to unprotected material, that is, the absence of anything effusing protectability. It is suggested that these instances are outside the scope of the Directive​[30]​. On the other end of the spectrum, it is certain that member states have no liberty to permit circumvention where the purpose of doing so is to avail oneself of the benefit of a ‘limitation or exception’, such as for making private copies, or educational or media related uses​[31]​. These cases fall in the regulatory vicinity of Article 6(4), as implemented. At least for the limitations that are expressly enumerated under Article 6(4), beneficiaries cannot rely on the presence of limitations that would permit such use in the absence of TPM’s​[32]​. As will be argued, however, the distinction between uses covered by a limitation and uses not infringing copyright as such can be vague where the purpose is engage in (generally) derivative uses​[33]​. 

Dogmatic problems, then, initially emerge in scenarios falling in between those two fence posts. A user may circumvent, for instance, for the purpose of ‘enjoying’ a work or otherwise gaining access to unprotected information that may be part of a protected structure or database​[34]​. Permitting the latter would, to some extent, prevent the attrition of fundamental concepts such as the idea and information versus expression dichotomy​[35]​. In these cases, the complex problem of temporary copying and its impact on a principled copyright nexus emerges, which requires a dedicated analysis of the recent decision in Infopaq. The second scenario concerns situations that may be covered, under national law, by a limitation serving to sustain creative uses, such as the making of quotations, citations or parodies.  
II.	Testing the Copyright Nexus Under Article 6(1)
1.	Prohibiting Individual ‘Free’ Uses
The mere enjoyment of a work is not an activity that violates copyright. It follows that where a copyright nexus is required, circumvention is permitted. The person doing so does not circumvent with the object to infringe particular works​[36]​. Article 6 would therefore permit both the circumvention and the dissemination of tools enabling such activity, and it is difficult to see why this should not be the case. The problem was addressed, under Article 6(2), in the disputes surrounding mod chips. The disputes centre around copyright protection, yet clearly the commercial interest lie in safeguarding the ability to price differentiate and to attempt the prevention of (private) parallel imports, thus discouraging consumers from purchasing copies abroad or turning to alternative manufacturers.  

Hence, can a distributor or manufacturer of circumvention devices raise a defence that the device allows uses for third parties that are permissible under substantive copyright law? Cases involving individual acts of bypassing such encoding have not – unsurprisingly - been decided yet. However, the global litigation by Sony concerning the use of mod chips - a device that permits to circumvent control mechanisms attached to game consoles - suggests that the rights enjoyed under TPM rules an be exercised even where the use would otherwise not infringe copyright​[37]​.  In a number of decisions, courts have held that distributing mod chips constitutes a violation of TPM rules, though only with respect to the commercial manufacture and distribution under Article 6(2), as implemented​[38]​. Decisions tackling the assessment of individual mod chip use have not yet been judicially assessed. 

Under Article 6(2), the position is uncertain as regards the ‘mere enjoyment’ of legitimately purchased games because, concurrently, such chips permit the use of “pirated” games​[39]​. However, the private use of pirated games does not as such violate copyright. The attempts to enforce Article 6(2) were only partially successful, and the approaches reveal a vast array of divergent decision making. Much depended on interpreting – widely or narrowly – the meaning of what constitutes a TPM.  In the UK, for instance, it was held that mod chips as such do not allow copyright infringement​[40]​ within the meaning of Sec. 296ZF CDPA 1988, whereas a German decision found, on a rather elusive basis, that the ability to play ‘pirated’ games (which in the case was perceived to be the primary function​[41]​) should generally be discouraged​[42]​, thus allowing the claimant to prohibit technology permitting consumers to use any game not orginating from the claimant. The court arrived at that position via an extensive reading of Article 6(2), and through an obscure fusion of arguments based on both copyright policy and unfair competition concepts. 

Under Article 6(1), it would initially appear that a defence of ‘mere enjoyment’ was permissible​[43]​ - if activities such as viewing a DVD are not deemed to constitute copyright infringement, no rationale can convincingly be put forward that allows a conclusion that is different from cases where no copyright exists. But that view has limits for the treatment of both sub-paragraphs. First, a claimant may rely on the argument that the copyright infringement is present. In some UK decisions, the view was taken that a digital representation of the work in computer memory was sufficient to constitute a fixation (and thereby reproduction) of the work, here with regard to a computer game​[44]​. The situation may be slightly different in author’s right systems where the notion of fixation is unknown, yet here the argument that a temporary copy is created might similarly suffice​[45]​. Much would then depend on what is, if at all, being copied: this may be the work itself, though typically that argument would fail in case where the claimant is not the owner of the copyright in the works loaded​[46]​. 

Overall, the inconsistency between the decisions clearly evidences the lack of rationalisation. If it is correct to say that users have a right to play games or, similarly, to watch a DVD without infringing, then it is clear that copyright cannot be correct choice rationalising such protection. The policy motivation to prevent piracy cannot be resolved by affording a scope of protection to Article 6 that was clearly not intended, as otherwise a significant degree of legal uncertainty will ensue​[47]​. In addition, the decisions allowing the claims were oblivious to the diverse functions, at least some of which – such as the ability to play self made games – are rather desirable. Thereby, substantive copyright law is further diluted, since permitted uses are indirectly affected. The claimant’s reliance on discouraging piracy then effects the further ability to sub-divide markets and steer consumer behaviour, resulting in a near absolute ability of private actors to re-design statutory copyright law.    

Article 6(2) is then assigned an entirely different meaning, focussing on the ability to bypass a technological code that does not protect any interests traditionally associated with copyright. That stance adds an unrelated level of protection, safeguarding the ability to separate global markets and to price differentiate. 
  
2.	The Impact of Article 6(4) on the Scope of Article 6(1)
A user may wish to circumvent a TPM in order to engage in legitimate acts such as the making of quotations, parodies, citations and the like. It remains questionable whether relying on such purposes providers a defence under Article 6(1). The reason lies in the improbabilities surrounding the interface between TPM’s and (written or unwritten) limitations not enlisted in Article 6(4). 

Article 6(4) permits member states to render certain limitations enforceable​[48]​, and the vast majority of these typically concern uses for which otherwise remuneration is payable. Hence, does Article 6(4) contain a positive obligation to exclude a defendant from raising a defence based on limitations not mentioned therein? Indeed, it is an open issue whether Article 6(4) – which is intended to deal, primarily, with the manner in which specific institutional limitations can be exercised against over-protection through TPM’s – truly contains a programmatic and unequivocal obligation to exclude any other limitation as being enforceable. Hence, given that Article 6(4) expressly only asserts that member states may allow the enforceability of limitations, can the conclusion be drawn that the provsions also contains an unequivocal and programmatic division concerning the relationship between TPM’s and limitations​[49]​? As far as the contentious scope of Article 5(1), for example, is concerned, it is suggested that Article 6(1) does not apply where the use in question only necessitates the making of copies that are technically necessary in order to "being informed". Otherwise, any reliance on the mandatory defence under Article 5(1) would be futile where TPM’s are in place. Indeed, if the claimant could rely on any transient copy, the interaction between substantive copyright law would be perplexed, albeit that the core problem here remains the opaque due to the extensive stance EU law has taken on the meaning of the term ‘reproduction’​[50]​. 

Article 6(4), then, should ideally be understood as governing predominantly the interaction between limitations requiring a fair compensation​[51]​ and the use of TPM’s to regulate predominantly institutional access​[52]​. Hence, where TPM’s are applied to regulate uses that are covered by a limitation which requires some form of statutory payment for each use, the application of TPM’s allows a directly enforceable contract between individual intuitions and right holders. This is in line with the Commission’s overall policy to re-privatise copyright: claims for statutory equitable remuneration are incrementally substituted by individually negotiated contractual terms for payment. Article 6(4) in these cases ensures that some recourse is open to beneficiaries, by obliging right holders in general to voluntarily allow both the availability of access and a means to re-negotiate terms and conditions of use. 

This could well mean that, following the approach that copyright must be violated by such act, limitations that permit uses that have a predominate function based on information freedom can be invoked as a defence to Article 6(1). There is a good argument in that, for instance, the quotation right constitutes a mandatory limitation to the reproduction right​[53]​. Likewise, that approach would benefit other inherently restrictive uses such as parodies or pastiches. In the case of these limitations, an assessment based on a requisite copyright nexus may well turn differently, depending on the categorisation such uses have under national law. In this respect, one may compare the treatment of such uses in German and French or Belgian law. German law permits some creative uses under § 24 (1) of the Author’s Right Act, which dogmatically is not a limitation but a reiteration​[54]​ of the general principle that certain creative uses do not affect the reproduction right. Conversely, French law deals with parodies and pastiches in the chapter on limitations​[55]​. 

The effect of appreciating Article 6(4) as a programmatic segregation of all limitations, as defined under Article 5, thus results in the absurd finding that § 24 of the German Author’s Right Act would allow such (parodist​[56]​) use, because no infringing act is present, that must defended. The same use in France or Belgium would violate Article 6 (1) since here it constitutes, systematically, a limitation, which is in turn subjected to Article 6(4) as implemented. Certainly, this risks over-conceptualising copyright and prevents even a modicum of approximating effect. Yet even where one finds oneself dogmatically able to reach such conclusion in a systematically proper manner, one would still have to surpass the broad position that is claimed by those arguing for more extensive protection, which typically culminates in assertions that the simple presence of digitisation in itself is predominantly precarious.

3.	Conclusion
where norms positively allocating markets are absent, recourse to a property-based type of protection must likewise be avoided
. Again, the use made of ‘subject matter’ by users in such cases may be infringing or not, which is different from permitting software enabling to permit access to a program’s sour code for the entirely legitimate purpose of reverse engineering. The function of Article 6(2) here is to anticipate what kind of behaviour is the likely outcome of disseminating technologies. The general problem addressed here is not consumer behaviour, but whether keeping circumvention tools available in order to permit competition on secondary markets is desirable. This aspect should not be discounted, because TPM’s function as a technical barrier to entry in such cases. Where the position is defendable that such competition is required, TPM’s have a dual detrimental function. They discourage consumer choice because of the absence of available technology as well as harming incentives. Competition, then, has two further aspects. It may indeed be direct competition, which was sanctioned in the realm of computer programs and thus functional works at least where dominance is extreme. But in other cases, it will be more a form of indirect competition where third parties provide better and value added services that appeal to the market. Given such services are ‘new’ and consumer demand exists, TPM protection disallows the argument that such service may be provided on the basis of an existing limitation. Here, competition is not about the raw data but, in truth, about access to markets that evolve very dynamically. As an example, media monitoring services may be able to rely on existing limitations in national law permitting the use of digital technology​[57]​, even where the applicable limitation does not positively express such right. In case national courts reject such ability, consumers miss out on services based on the advantages of digital technology, especially in an area not commercially exp0loitd by traditional publishers. This interaction between an extension of limitations and existing property rights has exactly the same structure as cases concerning the practical ability to apply TPM’s in order to secure future markets. If works are protected by technology, such approach is rendered impossible because here a court would have to conclude in favour of a subsequent infringement of copyright. 

E.	The Dogmatic Interaction between Article 6(1) and 6(2)
The scope of the copyright nexus argument as a normative trope of TPM protection in copyright ultimately depends upon whether a meaningful distinction can be made between acts of private circumvention and acts consisting of commercial dealings in devices. Necessarily, the availability of circumvention tools to engage in otherwise legitimate uses depends on the construction of Article 6(2) and the scope to which the provision practically decreases the availability of circumvention tools. 

I.	The Normative and Pragmatic Function of Article 6(2)
Article 6(2) prohibits certain commercial dealings, and therefore operates as a norm regulating control over user’s potential future behaviour. It therefore cannot reproduce or reflect substantive copyright principles and consequentially renders the debate on the copyright nexus incrementally irrelevant. Prohibiting commercial dealings in circumvention devices is, therefore, always a matter of anticipating whether the eventual use will be infringing. That anticipation leads to a prohibitive effect that goes way beyond copyright, since permitting access to works always involves the danger that these works would hypothetically be subjected to infringing activities. 

At this juncture, the different rationales underlying Article 6(1) and (2) respectively– and their incremental overlap – noticeably materialize​[58]​. The use of mod chips, for example, predominantly interferes with the right holders intention to sustain price differentiations and, concurrently, to create a technological disincentive preventing piracy. Whereas the latter rationale may provide a sound basis for a more prohibitive approach under Article 6(2)​[59]​, the former contention does not sanction the control of individual acts of consumers. That imbalance is more broadly reflected in the debate on the proper dogmatic construction of Article 6. The provision is almost exclusively understood to protect copyright (that is, author’s interests), which, as noted, results in undesirable doctrinal inconsistencies. It thus appears that the emphasis placed on construing precisely how the interests may be balanced on a case by case basis is inadequate. 

Article 6(1) is predominantly a norm that affects the immediate relationship between consumers and right holders​[60]​. It allows a stricter dependence on substantive copyright law because the judicial review is ex post, and thus the intention of the person circumventing to engage in some infringing act is decisive​[61]​. Article 6(2) comprises typically market interests. The matrix covered under Article 6(2) is therefore tri-polar at least, requiring a future balancing between the interests of right holders, technology manufacturers and more general public policy concerns affecting information and communication freedom​[62]​. But the more generously the ex ante anticipation under Article 6(2) is conducted​[63]​, the more this will impact on the practical enforceability of free uses​[64]​, with major implications for constitutional law​[65]​. Whereas Article 6(1), if understood as being coupled with substantive public domain concerns, still appears to partially regulate only certain acts of circumvention that have, ex post, resulted in copyright infringement, Article 6(2) derogates from that principle by anticipating and regulating user behaviour. The question of the legal character, and the fundamental interests that are protected under Article 6(2), is therefore decisive.   
II.	The “Preparatory Act” Character of Article 6(2)
By far the most relevant provision of Article 6 is therefore found in its second sub-paragraph, that is, the prohibition on certain commercial dealings in circumvention devices. Under that norm, as will be demonstrated, courts necessarily do not have an option for an ex ante view, which risks creating a general control right over technology and the eventual effect of depriving the public of circumvention means in general, even where these might be used for legitimate purposes. Article 6(2) is often considered as prescribing a cohesively enumerated list of preparatory acts relevant to Article 6(1) as a principal tort. This would suggest that Article 6(2) is limited to copyright, and that therefore the same normative principles apply.  This perception leads to a dilemma since Article 6(2) (1) requires an ex ante analysis and (2), more importantly, it regulates a different legal relationship than Article 6(1) does. 

Current opinion views Article 6(2) - dogmatically - as a preparatory act that is somehow dependant on the scope of Article 6(1). In that sense, Article 6(1) would appear as a principal tort norm applying only where eventual copyright infringement (or a substantive likelihood of infringement) can be proven. Because Article 6(2) is deemed as a normative prohibition concerning, broadly speaking, acts of ‘aiding and abetting’ eventual violations of copyright by individuals, the claimant must show at least a clear jeopardy that the technology in question will be used to infringe copyright, rather than legitimate market interests. The point of attachment thus remains a rather general perception of a jeopardy of copyright infringement, underscored by the creed that digital technology predominantly endangers interests of copyright owners​[66]​.  The reason for that conceptual approach lies in the history of the legislative development. It was, for instance, undecided whether Article 11 WCT contains an obligation to prevent the dissemination of circumvention since it expressly only referred to individual acts​[67]​. If so, it was similar clear that such extension must to some extent be contingent upon the prohibition to circumvent​[68]​. Necessarily, the adoption of Article 11 WCT and the related provision under Article 18 WPPT was founded purely on principles of copyright and additional observations on the legal characterisation of the interests affected was unsurprisingly disregarded.

In Germany, the debate on the proper classification of Article 6(2) culminates in the related issue as to whether Article 6(2), as implemented, grants an individual right based on copyright​[69]​, or an opaque right outside the realm of copyright​[70]​, or indeed a plethora of rights based on a mixture of copyright and commercial interests. This uncertainty is visible in recent German jurisprudence which centred around the issue of whether the respective TPM rules under § 95a(2) of the Author’s Right Act protect interests safeguarded “by that Act”​[71]​. That position is dogmatically perilous. If is answered in the affirmative, the effect is that the exploiter using TPM’s is entitled to damages for copyright infringement – even though the dissemination of circumvention can hardly be described as an activity covered by any property right in substantive copyright. Here, the allocation of interests becomes nebulous: if TPM’s protect interests that are dogmatically not an element of substantive copyright law, the protection against technology, by and large, is based on a capricious diversity of allegedly protected commercial and/or ideational privileges. Allowing right holders employing TPM’s to claim compensatory damages on the basis of copyright infringement​[72]​ or under general tort rules​[73]​ thus in general permits two alternative and wide ranging presumptions. Either, the code is protected as such, which is misguided given the analogy between a fence protecting real property against trespass and the similar function technical code protection has as an electric fence. Alternatively, the position taken by the BGH allows the unrelated assumption of digital trespass​[74]​, which in turn leads to a wide ranging allocation of legally protected interests in any information –or at least, the assertion that the fact of applying a TPM affords protection in all cases where a modicum of copyright protection is present.

Despite the seemingly effortless classification of Article 6(2) as related, strictly speaking, to fundamental copyright principles, the approach seems practically unworkable. As noted, the function of Article 6(2) to allow control over third parties’ behaviour is logically incommensurate with substantive copyright principles. And in any case, copyright law does not afford to the right holder an absolute and positive right to stop any activity permitting private access and use of works.  It is suggested that the initial classification of Article 6(2) as a norm solely protecting copyright is misleading. It is too narrow in construing legal norms affecting control over technology as copyright-based norms; it is, concurrently, too opaque. It blends interests based on market considerations and, therefore, unfair competition, with ultimately personality-rights based interests of authorship protection. In the case of mod chips, for instance, the use of unauthorised products by consumers does not constitute an infringement of copyright, nor do acts of circumvention for purposes of quotations or parodies interfere with any legitimate interest of copyright owners. At this juncture, the copyright nexus debate is questionable: because courts may, rather flexibly, select legitimate interests from the methodogical arsenal of both copyright and commercial interests, the unavoidably extension in scope under Article 6(2) may backfire on the scope afforded under Article 6(1). Ultimately, a creeping notion of a positive access right to any information with an almost proprietary character is established. Such advance obscures the dedicated enumeration of positive economic rights and affords protection to virtually any person possessing information in a digital form. That tendency has, already, been accelerated by the trend to increasingly afford protection to technical works and structures. Concurrently, however, the dependence on copyright principles may be too strict: in case where copyright is clearly not infringed, such as where access tools are distributed allowing consumers access to unprotected works, a gap of protection remains. This gap may be filled by employing by additionally employing unfair competition principles; but that option is not open to member states such as the UK.  Hence, the notion of an act of contribution to copyright infringement is too vague. Hence, the presence of the TPM rules render the protection rationale obliterate and nebulous, and there is doubt as to whether the commercial interests involved are fully appreciated: the analysis, in a binary fashion, will either turn out to be too narrow or too broad. A provider of – specifically – cost intensive online services such as online computer games or vast databases clearly has no specific interests based on copyright protection but interests that are based on protection against free riding by appropriating the investment by offering circumvention tools.. From that perspective, the debate on whether Article 6(2) should be classed exclusively as a form of contribution carries no great weight. As with the provisions concerning conditional access​[75]​, Article 6(2) regulates the relationship between legitimate market interests of some service providers​[76]​ and those free-riding on that investment. These may well require a different treatment than is currently possible under considerations solely based on copyright​[77]​.   In that sense, the regulation of TPM protection as a matter exclusively endorsed by copyright law seems misplaced.   

F.	The End of the Copyright Nexus: after Infopaq 
Hence, although member states retain certain freedoms to achieve some modicum of dogmatic equilibrium between substantive copyright and TPM protection, the ECJ’s Infopaq decision of 16 July 2009 raises doubts as to the overall meaningfulness of that stance. The decision concerns the treatment of temporary copies indirectly a further and potentially legal analysis becomes additionally intricate in cases where the claimant can rely on an eventual temporary copying of material, since here arguably the elements of copyright infringement are met​[78]​.  

According to Article 2, every transient and/or partial copy suffices for the purpose of infringement. Herein lies the perhaps most absurd mutation from clearly defined right towards complete TPM protection, since in almost all cases where a work is loaded some transient copy ensues. It is not intended here to fully analyse the intricacies surrounding the temporary copying problem as such​[79]​, but to place the provisions in the context of current substantive and exclusive rights in order to reveal the futility of the copyright nexus debate. In case the unavoidable temporary copy is present following an act of circumvention, the analysis must turn to Article 5(1), which exempts certain transient copies. Article 5(1) in itself embeds a convoluted architecture and a difficult system of exceptions and re-exceptions, attributable, ultimately, to the fact that the provision is a compromise. It counters the serious problem that control over all types of temporary copying means control over almost all digital uses, an issue to which international convention law has not found itself able to clearly act in response​[80]​. Article 5(1) thus cultivates an unrestrained understanding of the scope of TPM protection as an unrestrained form of protection on the basis of the contentious definition of the reproduction right.  

The relevant issue whether, dogmatically, transient copies must be perceived as an inherent element of the reproduction right, or alternatively as acts that are unconditionally exempt from that right, remains open​[81]​. There is, albeit, one express legislative exception: according to Dutch law​[82]​, copies that fall in the vicinity of Article 5(1) are exempt as such. Such copies do not ‘infringe’ the reproduction and therefore do not form part of the conventional chapter of limitations. Transient copies covered under Article 5(1) have no doctrinal effect and, importantly, must not be subjected to Article 6(4). The practical effects are, however, limited. As will be seen, Article 5(1) contains rather elusive and open-ended elements. 
I.	Article 5(1) in a TPM Context
The pathway to invoke Article 5(1) – and the decision making options the norm allows in a TPM context – are complex. Article 5(1), as far as relevant here, does not apply in case:

	A copy occurs as part of a technical process​[83]​
	A copy is temporary rather than transient
	A copy is transient but not part of a lawful use
	The use is lawful but has ‘own economic significance’





Until the Infopaq decision, it was neither clear precisely what types of copies are covered​[84]​, or what is exactly meant by the ‘lawful use’ element under Article 5(1)(b)​[85]​. More critically, Article 5(1) finally makes reference to an independent economic significance test relating to of the use during which the allegedly offending copies are being made​[86]​. At this last juncture, the language of the three step test (Article 5(5)) is reflected by assigning right holders a general privilege to control markets via the control over temporary copies. Therefore, Article 5(1) now has matured into the lynchpin of the information society. The delicate question of whether a copy is temporary rather than merely transient – an issue that is entirely contingent upon assessing technical processes rather than applying normative principles​[87]​ – decides ultimately on whether circumvention is permitted or not​[88]​. 

The Court of Justice had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguous wording of Article 5(1). In its judgement​[89]​, a preliminary reference from the Danish Supreme Court, the Court of Justice interpreted the interplay between Article 5(1) and Article 2 for the first time. The decision is highly relevant to the copyright nexus argument, and evidently demonstrates the degree to which Article 5(1) will, at least where the copyright nexus argument is promoted, continue to provide the decisive backdrop on which TPM protection – and the scope of Article 6(1) in particular – will rest. 

The peculiarity of the case lies in the fact that it was not disputed that consent was not required by right holders for the general business in which the claimant was engaged as a media monitoring service, since such activity would be covered by the traditional limitation allowing the making of copies for monitoring and ‘manual’ selection purposes. In other words, apart from the making of temporary copies, publishers cannot rely on copyright to prevent the provision of media monitoring services to third parties. The decision concerns a situation similar to recent German and Swiss case law, where similarly the use of press articles for media monitoring and supply services was at stake – in the decisions, the activity as such was permissible despite the fact that no limitation would expressly cover such use. The problem was that Infopaq employs digital technology involving the making of transient copies in the process, such as storing and scanning of press snippets, and that these uses concerned sequences of “eleven words” from newspaper articles being temporarily copied. The Court avowed, first, that the question of whether any reproduction within the meaning of Article 2 a) had been created was subject to national law, though it –startlingly – insisted that it was a condition under the Directive that any portion taken must in itself be protectable as the author’s own intellectual creation​[90]​. It observed that the Directive aims at a high standard protection where digital uses are concerned​[91]​. The court then continued and asserted that Article 5(1) was to be treated as a limitation. Article 5(1) thus derogates from the broad reproduction right, and therefore is conditional on the abstract rule of narrow construction under general EU law principles​[92]​. Therefore, Article 5(1) had to be construed solely in the light of the technological process, where copies were made in the absence of human intervention. Hence, where a choice can be made as to whether the copy is deleted, that copy is temporary rather than transient and arguably excludes copies made after loading works into RAM. In turn, Article 5(1) factually remains applicable only in the of browsing and caching​[93]​  This suggests that printing out snippets in the process had to be treated as infringement​[94]​.  In addition, the Court alluded to the applicability of the three step test (Article 5(5)) to acts involving temporary copying as covered under Article 5(1). Overall, the decision denotes a trend to shift from normative reasoning, based on technology neutrality towards rule making founded upon solely a technical effect in the application of digital technology​[95]​. 

III.	Dogmatic Effects on Article 6
These findings purport, in turn, an extremely generous perception of copyright with further repercussions when applied in a TPM context. First, the court contends that a temporary copy is to be treated as a reproduction in its own right, irrespective (apparently) of whether such copy allows the making of a more permanent copy that would be covered by a limitation. Right holders may then, where the copy is temporary, claim infringement even where the process is geared towards a lawful use. Hence, where a work is loaded from a physical carrier onto a PC in order to make a quotation, it is only the final copy (i.e. the material that was quoted) to which the quotation defence applies. The preceding copy in RAM would not pass the initial test of sufficient transience because its existence and duration is dependent upon human intervention. Hence, even where the subsequent use was ‘lawful’, Article 2 applies regardless unless courts are prepared to heed the academic opinion that Article 5(1) does not constitute a limitation but a specific area where copyright is not infringed. That proposition will become difficult to make given that the Court of Justice expressly – and without further dealing with the nature of that rule – subjects Article 5(1) to the same conditions as the non-mandatory limitations under Article 5(2) and 5(3). The approach is partial to a specific technological process​[96]​. Effectively, then, copyright infringement depends on the type of process that is being used, rather than on the medium upon which the work is reproduced and the functionality of such medium. 

The narrow approach on Article 5(1) has certainly a detrimental impact on national decision making and indeed conflicts with the more dedicated treatment of media monitoring services before national courts. Simply, where a TPM is in place, Article 5(1) is inapplicable; the Court thus inadvertently created an all-encompassing use right which automatically defies any attempt to align substantive copyright with TPM protection​[97]​.   
1. 	Article 5(1) as a Limitation
It is suggested that the characterization of Article 5(1) as a limitation subject to a narrow interpretation is inappropriate. First, nothing apart from a reference to an abstract (and as such unelaborated) methodological principle suggests that a copyright limitations must be construed narrowly, or, for that case, widely. It must be construed in the light of its specific function. Second, Article 5(1) is a result of a compromise package. There are no norms in international copyright law that expressly afford protection to temporary copies, let alone to transient copies. Its presence is the result of a lengthy legislative history that sought to balance the all-encompassing effects of a technology-based normative control rights versus upholding liberty in substantive copyright law​[98]​. Article 5(1) – whatever its systematic allocation in the Directive appears to suggest – confirms that the reproduction right does not extend to temporary copies as such. The provision therefore exempts such copies from the scope of the reproduction right: where Article 5(1) applies, the reproduction right is therefore not affected​[99]​. This makes sense because otherwise the reference to a subsequent lawful use - i.e. one that is permitted under a statutory limitation – would be obsolete; where a transient copy has the same status as a permanent copy, the right holder is able to rely on the occurrence of a technological necessity that in itself is subject to a further scrutiny under Article 5(5), despite the fact that Article 5(1) already refers to an independent economic significance.    

Consequentially, if Article 5(1) – even though the provision is extremely narrowly interpreted – is struck out as a ‘defence’ under Article 6(1) for acts of merely using a work without making any functional permanent copy, subsequent copyright infringement can more effortlessly be sustained under Article 6(2). In turn, this effects a much broader ability of right holders to strike out any technology allowing the making of temporary copies even where the use does not materially impact on any interest safeguarded by copyright, or where the subsequent use is covered by a defence. 

2. 	Transient Copies and Article 6(4)
The treatment of temporary copies as having per se the same status as infringing an exclusive right similarly weakens the position under Article 6(4). Article 5(1) is not mentioned in Article 6(4). Given that Article 5(1) is not mentioned in Article 6(4), this denotes that even where it applied so as to provide a defence to copyright infringement, it cannot, dogmatically, apply where a TPM is circumvented. Overall, this has effects not merely on Article 6(1) – the unelaborated analysis of Article 5(1) illustrates a fundamental   intricacy entrenched in the Directive: would it automatically follow that any limitation that is not declared as being enforceable under national law, but that complies with the enumerated limitations thereunder, is barred from being enforceable? The effect is, again, the redundancy of the copyright nexus debate, though here due to the dogmatic stipulation that Article 2 seems to afford to any reproduction​[100]​. 

The Directive is silent on the relationship between Article 5(1) and Article 6(4). Article 6(4), likewise, does not contain anything that mandatorily and expressly excludes national courts from allowing acts of self help​[101]​. It merely permits, as noted, member states to render certain limitations enforceable, and the vast majority of these typically concern uses for which otherwise remuneration is payable. In that sense, the view might seems acceptable be taken that Article 6(4) cannot be construed so as to give a clear indication that reliance on that limitation must be excluded entirely as a defence to Article 6(1). As was suggested here, Article 6(4) makes no express provision to that effect – it is up to national law to decide whether circumvention for the purpose of making quotations and other socially desirable uses should be prohibited, and from a general copyright policy perspective there is no sufficient reason to discourage these acts. Even in case where copyright is solely construed as a mechanism for economic efficiency, it is recognised that desirable uses such as for the purpose of making quotations –which, economically, are treated as externalities – are an element of achieving efficiency rather than an exception to full market control​[102]​.    

However, even though Article 2 may be surpassed before national courts by employing a more teleological approach to Article 6(1), two significant subsequent problems concerning the interaction between Article 6(1), 6(4) and the temporary reproduction right ensue. The first problem arises in relation to the future ability of national jurisprudence to determine the allocation of legitimate market interests on the basis of applying or extending limitations, which relates to the true conflict of interests underlying the Infopaq scenario. Secondly, the trope of a control right over temporary copies then, in a similar vein, affects the position of beneficiaries where access is to be provided, since again the legitimacy of enjoying a limitation is dependent on the technology. 

The first concern touches upon an intricate and eclectic conundrum. It should suffice here to point out that at least some national laws would permit media monitoring services such as the one in question here​[103]​, on the basis that limitations apply even where that activity is not expressly covered. Indeed, the selection, arrangement and summation of news is not subject to copyright; in that sense the notion that news could be subject to copyright is alarming. Where, conversely, entire news articles, protected by copyright, are being used, media monitoring services may invoke national limitations permitting archiving. The elegant solution in the German BGH “Press Clippings” decision​[104]​ reveals quite how far the ECJ jurisprudence is removed from much more sophisticated methodologies in national law. The BGH ‘combined’ two limitations – the general limitation allowing the making of copies for personal (including business) uses and the existing limitations permitting the making of copies for archiving purposes to construe a rather novel limitation; this allowed the extension of the underlying rationales of the two limitations in question to be applied by way of analogy to permit the digital storage and subsequent dissemination of press clippings. At the same time, the BGH made it a condition that authors receive equitable remuneration through a collecting society.  The Infopaq decision renders such creative lawmaking, based on a clear perception of the relative strengths of the conflicting interests, unattainable, unless some freedom of movement under national law is maintained​[105]​. The effect remains the same, irrespective of whether Article 2 is applied in a TPM context or not. It would have been clear from Article 5(1) and its reference to a lawful use that temporary copies must be assessed not on the basis of their technical existence but in the light of whether the subsequent use is permitted or not. The decision prevents this by making an unwarranted and unpersuasive distinction between temporary and transient copies – in other words, it is only where copy is made without human intervention that it is transient and that therefore some subsequent use may be permitted. This, in turn, was derived from the reference to ‘caching and browsing’ in Recital 23. This may have been one of the initial motivations but still the problem remains. On account of reading Article 5(1) as a limitations and by subjecting the function its function to a narrow interpretation, a rational and teleological construction is blocked due to the incomprehensible distinction the court made between transient and temporary copies. The immediate consequence is that any attempt to reconcile substantive copyright and TPM protection is abandoned, albeit where copyright or database rights are absent.   In summary, the approach taken in Infopaq prevents the applicability of limitations as a means of increasing efficiency in the availability of value added information services. The interpretation of Article 5(1), in the same vein, immediately impacts on the degree of freedom left under Article 6(2) – that is, whether technology is available -  and introduces unnecessary obstacles when dealing with the attempt to utilise TPM’s to segregate markets​[106]​

Secondly, the decision impacts detrimentally on the position of beneficiaries of more conventional limitations and blocks a rational transition from a narrow onstruction towrads a more interest-related application. For instance, where a library asserts rights for making digital copies against applied TPM’s as foreseen under Article 6(4)(1), as implemented,  right holders now enjoy an array of arguments that ultimately leads to an entire privatisation of copyright and an employ both the temporary copying argument.  It is very much open, and will depend on a number of factors, in how far the use of TPM’s will effectively allow a privatisation of uses otherwise safeguarded. Although Article 6(4) may require, initially, voluntary steps taken by right holders, the degree to which limitations are enforceable depends ultimately on the nature and purpose of the limitations as well as on the nature of the procedure that is to be followed. In general, a distinction may be made between private and adjudicative types of dispute resolution. In the case of private procedural forms such as mediation, the outcome would be of a contractual nature, thus potentially allowing individual agreements. More problems that are critical emerge where access to courts – with a view of obtaining injunctive relief in order to make use of the limitations – is foreseen. A court is then faced with the general conflict whether or not, where the right holder employing TPM’s has taken voluntary steps that fall short of the privilege granted in statute, the privilege is to be fully reinstated or whether a limited permission to use, accompanied by requests for additional payment, would pre-empt that privilege. Again, this would depend on the character of limitations, and certainly the strongest protection is afforded in countries where limitations are seen as mandatory and in general not override able by contract. The Infopaq decision prompts a further exclusionary tendency and unnecessarily weakens the position of institutions to enforce limitations which further reduces public welfare​[107]​.  

Finally, then, the point may be made that where TPM’s have been applied, the reference to the three step test (as under Article 5(5)) denote that Article 5(1) should be applied rather more restrictively in the light of a market that is distinct from a traditional mode of exploitation. Therefore, a separate ‘economic significance’ is present because of the right holder’s choice to, for instance, market digital works using employing control mechanisms. This is because a restrictive reading of the three step test as applicable to DRM-ordered markets means that the limitation (here: Article 5(1)) must be construed in the light of this specific form of exploitation. Apparently, this was the view taken by the French Supreme Court​[108]​. The court distinguished traditional forms of exploitation from TPM-controlled exploitations of DVD’s distributed with copy control mechanisms: the private copying could therefore not be exercised where TPM’s are applied since allowing so would conflict with that normal exploitation​[109]​, and in that sense the two possible forms of exploitation (with or without TPM’s) must be treated distinctly. The attempt to permit the private copying limitation to be enforced as against the copy control tools thus failed because the exception had to be assessed in the light of the test under Article 5(5)​[110]​. 
3. 	Conclusion: The Transient Copying Metaphor
The Infopaq ruling rides roughshod over delicate issues that merit a dedicated and detailed analysis and which, as seen, affect each and every component of digital copyright law. Right holders may argue that the privilege to take advantage of a limitation is, contrary to the statutory permission, restricted and contingent on entering into agreements constraining permitted uses; such agreements may easily allow for, for instance, pay-per-view or pay-per-use clauses, since here necessarily each electronic use will individually allow right holders to rely on temporary copies. Institutional limitations will thus be subjected to a continues demand to monitor specific uses, placing extreme administrative burdens on libraries and educational institutions. in the end, then, where a TPM is applied to individual works the situation is the same as in the case of online services. even though, for instance, a library may have a certain privilege to make copies, this privilege is destroyed not necessarily because of the presence of the TPM, but because of the fact that in order to ‘use’ individual works transient copies may be necessary. Thereby, each dispute between right holders and privileged institutions will additionally be perplexed by a general argument of technical use. 

If a more functional approach had been employed, the court would have had a chance to assess the function of the reproduction right in a digital environment more clearly, focussing on the effect of a wide understanding of Article 2 and its consequences in the overall system of digital copyright. As such, preserving the meaning of the reproduction right – as a right allowing control over copies that functionally replace the use of the original  – suggests maintaining a technology-neutral approach. In a second step, it may be asked whether certain uses should be controllable for the purpose of allowing recoupment of investment, and it is the latter that gives credence to the final element under Article 5(1)​[111]​. Apparently, the Court of Justice was influenced by the desire to perfect harmonisation rather than to rely on national laws to develop, step by step, a workable model of copyright and a clearer perception of how the advantages of digital technology are to be allocated, a mission that can unquestionably not be resolved by distinguishing transient from temporary reflections of data, and by dispensing with any teleogically sound analysis.  The literal construction of Article 5(1) proposed by the Court, as well as the brevity with which it reintroduces principles of a narrow construction of Article 5(1) as a limitation neglects the fact that it is digital technology itself that has fostered a development to reconsider how the balance is struck, rather than simply affording more protection for the sake of harmonisation. The ultimate aim of the Directive must be – as the court rightly points out – to achieve some balance, but this clearly cannot be accomplished by reverting to a technology-centred understanding of activities that include digital representations without any function​[112]​. Admittedly, Article 5(1) – as well as the overall ambiguity underlying the Directive – makes it difficult to detect interpretative mechanisms that actually go beyond a technology-centred approach. However, a more informed ruling would have been welcome, both as regards the general status of Article 5(1) as well as the consequential effects the decision has on reconciling TPM and copyright protection. 

Decision making principles that are not based on technological neutrality risk missing a clear perception of the multitude of interests that must be brought in line. These interests go way beyond a conflict between ‘right holders’ and ‘users’. The Court perilously derives its position from a seemingly literal and systematic approach, yet from a provision that in itself was the result of uncertainties surrounding the status of temporary copies. The ruling is testament to the difficulties that are created by normative solutions based on EU compromise packages, which largely ignores the complex legal and public policy issues. The construction of Article 5(1) as a limitation to be construed narrowly and as a matter of an alleged methodological principle applicable to Article 5(1) as an ‘exception’ – on the basis of two unrelated ECJ decisions – is to be rejected. It demonstrates, however, the differences between national court decisions adamant to allow legal evolution precisely on account of the dynamics of digital technology and the effects of applying a literal and tehnology-centred modus of interpretation targeted to harmonisation. 

Overall, nothing in the decision shows that the court took the time to ponder the consequences – consequentially, any future dispute concerning the extension of existing limitations in a digital environment will now centre on the presence of temporary copies. Where copies necessary for processing information in the realm of a given limitations are, conversely, held to be transient, much will speak in favour of the exploiter’s interest, on account of reading a prerogative for market allocation into the ‘economic significance’ test.      

The decision is extremely unfortunate, not only because of its general protectionist tendency, but more precisely because necessary and unavoidable copies can be employed, ultimately, as metaphors for a general use right, which immediately renders any attempt to couple TPM and copyright protection a fruitless endeavour. It impacts on the availability of limitations that permit value added services and insinuates a notion that copyright axiomatically embeds a privilege of right holders enabling control over any use. This position reinforces, ultimately, a right to consent to any digital use once ownership can be claimed​[113]​. The decision eschews a teleological approach and disregards the general dangers and inconsistencies arisisng from a vast right to prohibit digital uses. In general, this is not a criticism of the Court itself - the approach is informed by the axiomatic position taken under the Directive that digitisation presents, almost unconditionally, a danger to right holders. That sentiment was arguably influenced by the drive to deal, predominantly, with issues such as file sharing. It is sustained by a wider economic policy asserting that near absolute protection leads to an efficient system of information dissemination. In such exclusivity, that position is patently wrong. Asserting a danger to which the law must respond is contingent on clarity about the function of the normative rule endorsing control, and even where a purely economic efficiency argument is employed, it is by no means certain how axiomatic economic foundations can be defined​[114]​. This is relatively unsurprising​[115]​. Competition on providing services is increasingly based on continuously created and diverging use modalities in a highly dynamic environment. The more these dynamics accelerate, the more the efficiency trope will have to be modified – from merely being able to being ‘informed’ towards more convenient manners of acquiring copyrightable information. The true question is whether any future use should as such be allocated to existing right holders. Neither can such position be deduced exclusively from traditional incentive theories, nor can exploiters rely on a constitutional property privilege to have all such use modalities, now and future, reserved to themselves, because the opportunities associated with digitisation are not an effect of their investment.  

In summary, even the laudable express categorisation of Article 5(1) as a ‘carve out’ provision, as expressly introduced into Dutch law​[116]​, remains futile after Infopaq. The constituent elements leave a wide margin of appreciation and infuse copyright with a fickle array of admissible argument and judgement. The interpretation of Articles 2 and 5(1) delivers right holders a standard argument to suppress otherwise legitimate uses, to reduce the impact of limitations on competition and to further design marketing activities around traditional copyright principles. The problem lies in Article 2 itself. But it is accelerated by the additional drive to revert to an utterly rigid construction for the benefit of approximating copyright laws to a standard where complete harmonisation is attained. In turn, the temporary copying right and its implications for entirely legitimate uses  demonstrates the need for re-assessment of the Directive. It also supports the view that the bias towards technology is misguided; the metaphorical allocation of interests in digital uses eclipses the need for a guided exploration for axiomatically sound principles of digital copyright law. 


G.	Paradigm Shifts: Market  Orientation under Article 6(2)
Therefore, one solution more consistent with substantive copyright protection, whilst preserving a modicum of consistency with public domain concerns, would lie in re-conceptualizing Article 6(2) in line with pr-existing norms protecting against such activities. In general, allocating the TPM rules to the domain of unfair competition has the advantage to provide courts with a system that is left untainted by notions of property rights and strict liability. In addition, such doctrinal re-conceptualization is constructive, at least in offering some relief from having to explain the general conceptual inconsistencies of the normative TPM rules as protecting copyright as personal property. As has been seen, the legal implication of the TPM rules go far beyond preventing the making of copies for the purpose of illegal file sharing, where arguably it is acceptable to tolerate the legal capacity of right holders to set private norms and to extend copyright as they see fit. 

Apart from this, the advantage of re-conceptualizing TPM rules as protecting a legitimate market interest would effectively offer a much needed relief for copyright because it allows a clearer demarcation between interests based on copyright and interests based on a necessary intervention in competition. In addition, of course, unfair competition law offers a greater flexibility that may take into account the relative strengths of the parties' alleged legitimate interests. Furthermore, such shift in perspective also allows a different perspective on whether a normative prohibition against acts of circumvention is necessary. A more market oriented approach to Article 6(2) would also, de lege ferenda, allow to resolve the issue of who precisely is protected by Article 6(2). The current formulation is vague: consent by the right holder must be present. This includes authors and those enjoying statutory neighboring rights but it remains unresolved whether an exclusive licensee, such as a publisher, or the operator of a download service applying TPM’s would have locus standi​[117]​.     

The unfair competition approach is based on a notion of fairness which requires further examination and categorization. Article 6(2) is, as noted, a provision rooted in notions of free riding, that is, the general misappropriation of a market value by a third party. 
I.	Flexibilities of Investment Protection: Online Service Protection  
In that sense, there is no direct competition between entities exploiting copyright on the basis of TPM’s and those who manufacture and disseminate tools to enable consumers to circumvent. Both operate on different markets. There is, however, competition when looking at the demand side, because the availability of circumvention tools gives consumers a choice of who to pay. 

Unfair competition was frequently at issue in the past in Germany. In a number of decisions, it was held that offering circumvention tools fell within the traditional unfair competition categories of unfair interference with business, obstruction of competition and unlawful exploitation in the sense of a parasitic exploitation of a third parties commercial endeavor​[118]​. Notably, protection against the dissemination of circumvention tools was based on very broad notions of fairness, and indeed these decisions raise issues as to whether unfair competition should operate so as to provide a complementary form of protection​[119]​. In addition, courts based their decisions on (inter alia) obstruction of markets by diverting consumer demand and interfering with business whilst not making own efforts.

Indeed, when applying unfair competition notions to distill workable rationales of TPM protection, a more refined approach is required. Not much is added when replacing one broad notion with another, especially if an extensive commercial tort of immoral or parasitic exploitation is applied per se​[120]​.  One such approach was subtly asserted in the decision of the German BGH in Paperboy​[121]​. Here, the BGH asserted that unfair competition law does not protect against the setting of deep links to information not protected by copyright, but at the same time concluded that the position might be different where TPM’s had been used. This leaves open, ultimately, whether the use of TPM’s applied against access through deep links was an act contravening unfair competition law as such, in constituting an act of misappropriation, or whether at least some further differentiation was required that takes into account the ultimate objective to secure fairness in the marketplace​[122]​. Hence, where no individual choice was made to apply TPM’s the claimant could not rely, in order to acquire protection based on unfair competition, on the hypothetical legal power to so. In addition, the reference to the absence of TPM’s demonstrates a clear proximity to the unfair competition notions underlying the conditional access rules, which, as noted, to some extent provided the regulatory model underlying Article 6(4)(4)​[123]​. Where an entity protects online material by using access control mechanisms, the unfair competition approach is commensurate with both Article 6(4)(4), according to which limitations cannot be exercised, and the provisions under the conditional access rules. An online service to which general access is denied fulfills the elements of both provisions. The underlying (though not expressly mentioned) perception therefore was that in general allowing customers to circumvent such control constituted an act of unfairness, not because of simply enabling such circumvention per se, but because of the overall detrimental effects that permitting such commercial exploitation of circumvention tools has on the general incentive. This demonstrates that the test is three-partite: first, the nature of the information to which access is allowed is immaterial. Second, the commercial dissemination of tools enabling to by-pass access control mechanism may constitute an act of unfair competition. At this junction, thirdly, there is no need to make choice  determining whether protection is granted against a certain unfair, ‘immoral’ type of commercial behavior or whether it is given to objectively protect a public policy function, i.e. creating incentive. The latter is commensurate with the traditional notion of investment protection; but that protection remains constrained to a specific clash of interests. First, the attempt to effectively divert consumers may be conjured up as an undesirable form of behavior. Indeed, it is difficult to see why, if a moral stance is taken, such behaviour should not be classed as unfair, as ultimately it remains free riding. But whether general notions of such unfairness should operate is still very much is very much a matter of predominantly national considerations of market freedom and fairness, though caution must be exercised against infiltrating competition law with standards of axiomatic morality​[124]​. 

The decisive issue thus arises from public policy considerations. This is a more objective test that can effortlessly be used to explain Article 6(2) without the need to re-conceptualize substantive copyright law, and certainly a position already present in the aquis communautaire following the identical policy objective underlying the database maker right, which likewise emerged from initial considerations based on elements of unfair competition​[125]​.  What emerges from the decision in Paperboy is, thus, arguably not a general prerogative to suppress access but a notion of protecting an interest that lies beyond protecting property and thus is a liability rule.  In the case of online services, therefore, protection is not provided in order to protect copyright. It is based on the assumption that typically a high level of investment is present. From that perspective, the legislative model underpinning the protection of online services is certainly favorable. How far such assumption carries is, then, open to further scrutiny, as is certainly demonstrated by the as yet indeterminable scope of the database maker right, but that approach has the tremendous advantage of allowing courts some margin of appreciation. This allows to overcome the misguided attempts to coercing courts having to dogmatically conceptualize TPM protection as a proprietary rule. In addition, it allows a clear distinction between a protection rationale based on author’s rights and commercial vulnerabilities. The protection afforded is thus coupled with consideration of the extent to which permitting the dissemination of circumvention tools is likely to undermine that objective, rather than providing each entity possessing information with an absolute prerogative to control the use of information that is ultimately based on sheer practical capacity to use TPM’s; it follows that the presence of the TPM rules does not provide an argument for a simple privilege to extend copyright, which is still left for statutory copyright law to decide. from that perspective, the dogmatic problems that have arisen in relation to a categorization of Article 6(2) as comprehensively listing activities that may be qualified as contributory activities becomes pointless. 
II.	The Interaction between Investment and Copyright
These considerations are, at best, preliminary. They can explain the protection of online series but as such do not provide an answer for whether the distribution of tools allowing cracking technologies that protect an individual work would likewise amount to unfair competition, and if so, how such protection could alternatively be balanced with substantive copyright law. The dissemination of circumvention tools must be permitted in certain cases. The realm of such cases must, necessarily, be informed by public policy considerations. 

The problem lies in identifying control mechanisms that prevent access to an individual work rather than acts allowing clear-cut permitted uses. Hence, any access control applied to an individual work has a dual function. It follows that any tool allowing circumvention likewise may permit the individual use that is restricted by copyright or not. This duality of use modalities if extremely difficult to overcome because, as noted, any provision protecting TPM’s against the possibility of infringing use covers both situations, and factually courts have no opportunity in such case but to allow the claim on the basis of hypothetically permitting infringing uses. Hence, there is a concoction of rationales that apply. 

However, some initial categorization is useful. First, the basis for a claim under unfair competition law is much weaker, if not entirely refutable, where the eventual use is not affecting a protected market interest. Where the general legitimacy of a claim is based on preventing copyright infringement, it automatically follows from the traditional co-existence between Intellectual Property and unfair competition law that certain additional elements must be present that render the activity – i.e. the production and distribution of circumvention tools – unfair. If this is taken seriously, the only meaningful category where such unfairness can be observed remains an act by which the market itself is devalued. However, the extent to which such interest can be claimed is governed by substantive statutory copyright law, at last in cases where the claimant is unable to show a level of investment in applying the TPM’s that goes significantly beyond the usual costs associated with a traditional form of exploitation, i.e. in cases where substantially high transactions costs (as compared to costs incurred in traditional forms of exploitation) are involved. However, this would be rare. Concurrently, permitting legitimate uses by consumers cannot at the same time violate a legitimate market interest if the public policy function of copyright is taken into the equation, even if it was possible to argue for extended market protection due to a different (i.e. TPM-ordered) mode of exploitation​[126]​. 

Certainly, the unfair competition law is constrained in cases where interests based on copyright conflict. At this stage, further differentiations are necessary. If it is not objectionable to circumvent for non-infringing uses, the problem lies in the over-extensive effect of Article 6(2) as practically rendering such acts impossible. One initial future solution is to exclude from Article 6(2) the manufacturing of circumvention tools upon individual requests for non-infringing uses. Overall, this would leave sufficient protection against mass scale production whilst continuing the balance between the interests impinged upon.   

III.	„Secondary Market“ Protection
Turning to issues outside the realm of truly cost-intensive online services, approaches based on unfair competition law may alleviate the need to apply monopoly control provisions such as Article 82 (1) EC vis-à-vis attempts to monopolies secondary markets, and would allow courts to employ a dogmatically sound freedom of juridical movement. The litigations before US courts concerning attempts to evade the freedom to reverse engineer by employing TPM’s​[127]​ demonstrated that the issue of secondary market control requires at last a modicum of flexibility​[128]​, especially where a statutory provision is in place that initially determines the allocation of interests in such case. However, there remain very difficult problems outside the decompilation rules, in particular whether by using an unfair competition approach the ability to liberalize secondary markets by way of applying copyright limitations can be generalized. At present, as far as copyright limitations are concerned, the commercial exploitation of circumvention tools cannot be legitimized by reliance on the ability of individual persons or entities to invoke a defense. 

1. 	Limitations and TPM’s

From the inherent logic of the Directive, this is reasonable. The limitations permitted under Article 5 (2) and 5(3) in general exclude reliance where the use is for commercial purposes​[129]​, and additionally do not appear to permit arguments based on an agency function, i.e. the freedom to provide such service on behalf of individual beneficiaries. Hence, substantive copyright law excludes arguments based on profiting from copyright on related markets even in case where a value added service is offered​[130]​. Such cases, therefore, are subject to proceedings under competition law, in particular Article 82 (1) EC, as well as general provisions under national law. Indeed, a variety of legal mechanisms exist that permit secondary markets to be accessible, ranging from immediate copyright limitations, specific compulsory licensing provision, establishing a duty to license on account of an abuse of a dominant position to the general current debate on whether and how existing copyright limitations should be applied to cover such situations. The details of these provisions are, individually, too copious to warrant a detailed analysis here. However, their presence as normative rules and, in particular, the general debate on the function of copyright limitations in relation to secondary uses of copyright material evidences that an absolute prohibition on circumvention tools is, exclusively, undesirable. However, this is not an issue to be regulated by TPM rules, but by evolving copyright limitations and recognizing the emerging perception of limitations as having an  economic function that requires, on a case by case basis, precise balancing. Once the perception that limitations are to be construed narrowly, and that they are merely grounded in abstract freedom of information concepts is overcome, the way is paved for dealing with the scope of Article 6(2) in a more informed manner. 

The core question to be posed is whether a party disseminating tools enabling the circumvention of  applied TPM’s should be allowed to raise the argument that the tools would enable, for the benefit of workable competition, to prevent monopolization. Here, the problem lies in normative copyright law and its convergence with general competition concerns. Clearly, the assessment of these interests dos not shift simply because TPM’s are applied. At present, however, the Directive does not offer a mechanisms for dealing with such cases.

Cases such as the various Sony mod chip litigations are structurally similar to attempts to encrypt software in order to prevent reverse engineering for purposes of decompilation. This is because in both scenarios the conflict of interests lies in who has control (or access to) related and after-markets. These offer a good example of how divergent legal rationales underpinning TPM protection can be resolved. 

In relation to encrypted copyright programs, individual reverse engineering remains possible because the rules on software copyright law have been left intact, and the Computer Program Directive does not protect against acts of individual circumvention. The provsions similar to Article 6(2) - Article 7(1)(c) of that Directive – then is a good example of how a different legal regime might result in a different and generally broadened dogmatic approach. The limitations present in software copyright law are based on a legal preference in favour of opening up secondary markets. For instance, in a UK decision concerning encryption​[131]​ the court established that the decompilation rules take precedence, and – importantly - constrained the claimant’s attempt to concurrently invoke breach of commercial confidence. Hence, even though arguably the encrypted information had some commercial value, and was therefore initially protectable under the law of confidential information in addition to being protected under copyright law, the court rejected the claim.  

The decision is, functionally though not dogmatically, in line with a range of decision in the US where TPM’s had been applied to software in order to prevent the marketing of articles on secondary markets​[132]​. The deliberations in these decisions are relevant because, at least for the uninitiated reader, the protection afforded to software copyright under § 1201(1) of the DMCA is absolute. Nevertheless, the decisions rather elegantly construed the DMCA on the merits and dogmatically allowed a limitation to copyright to supersede TPM protection despite the clear wording – an approach that appears light years from the narrow and literal reading of the EUD by the Court of Justice.  Both examples highlight two issues. First, it is a matter of substantive copyright law how market interests are allocated. Where substantive copyright law allows the exercise of a limitation for general public welfare purposes, it is clear that an abstract approach based on a misguided dogma that a limitation must be interpreted narrowly is inapplicable whether or not a TPM is applied, which is sufficient evidence to refute notions of an absolute protection of TPM’s. This is specifically because of the nature of software copyright: it an effortlessly be extended towards controlling secondary markets which in turn stifles innovation for lack of an incentive​[133]​. Second, both clearly show that the approach is not based on a rule-exception-model but on an open consideration that laves a wide margin of appreciation. They also highlight a further flaw in the Directive: in case Article 6(1) was extended to cover computer programs – which is not entirely unimaginable – Article 6(4), as implemented, would arguably operate so as to block any attempt to rely on the decompilation limitation​[134]​. Therefore, an axiomatic attempt to qualify TPM protection as protecting ‘copyright’ is ineffectual – in the same sense that bypassing a TPM in order to access a sign protected by trade mark law dos not amount to trade mark infringement precisely because no use of that sign was made that would impact on nay legitimate interest of the trade mark owner​[135]​. It follows that where protection is granted to technologies such as those employed by Sony, reliance on an  abstract property nature as imposing duties on third parties leads to results that cannot co-exist with substantive law, and indeed reverse the normative hierarchy between the TPM rules as rule of enforcement of copyright itself.  Taking the opposite view is excluded as far as the internal structure of copyright law is concerned, and where a different, and indeed market based rationale is used to legitimise such claim, normative principles in copyright still provide a defence because of the existence of a legislative division of markets​[136]​.  

Even as far as reverse engineering is concerned, Article 6(3) of the Software Directive still makes it a condition that the act is carried out by the lawful user, which re-inserts general assumptions favoring software copyright protection, which further impacts on the  protection afforded against circumvention tools under Article 7(1)(c) of the Software Directive​[137]​.  Still, it remains predominantly an issue of the proper equilibrium between TPM protection under Article 6(2) and substantive copyright; a clear perception of market interests in such cases would permit European courts to follow the US examples and apply a more general test on the merits of TPM protection, since it can hardly be ascertained as such that applying TPM’s on an unfair competition basis should allow an unwarranted extension towards related or after markets. Leaving aside decompilation issues which are more clearly concerned with liberalizing secondary markets, the problem remains a general one: the ability to engage in uses on secondary markets may be legitimate. The legal categorization of asserting rights in secondary markets depends, roughly, on the use that is to be made of an Intellectual Property right. In decompilation cases, the Intellectual Property right acts as barrier to entry and access must be granted either technically (as in software copyright law) or on the basis of a compulsory license; in these cases, the ultimate decision on whether a license is to be agreed upon (and payment to be made) still depends on national law. in other cases, a third party may wish to use works not for the creation of a secondary market but for a use that make use of the information as such. In few cases, a compulsory licensing provision would allow this​[138]​. Other classes of cases are only just emerging: they concern the intricate problem of whether copyright limitations may, as far as digital uses are concerned, be extended above and beyond their wording or even applied by way of analogy so as to permit the creation of novel markets for value added services. These markets are, under general copyright law, reserved to existing right holders​[139]​. Still, the individual use may be covered by an (extended) limitation. Examples include, as noted above, the use of press snippets for the provision of media monitoring services. In these cases, German and Swiss judicature held that equitable remuneration was payable to authors​[140]​ but that the service was legitimate, a position strongly advocating a general ‘agency’ function of copyright limitations. 

These cases, if applied in a TPM context, face particular difficulties. As soon as an element of copyright infringement carried out by users is present, Article 6(2) would override any such defense. Again, this is because of the sheer presence of copyright and the hypothetical infringing individual use. The application of market oriented normative concepts alleviates much of the pressures on traditional copyright because the ability to provide circumvention tools in such cases can easily be calibrated to the assertions of statutory law and jurisprudential rule making.   

2. 	Enforcement Procedures   
The residual issue – once a duty to untie a secondary market is established – is of a procedural nature. Where the defendant asserts that the claimant has a duty to provide compulsorily license works on account of an abuse of a dominant position, or because a compulsory licensing provision is present in statutory copyright law, it is highly questionable whether such contention can be utilized as a defense against acts that infringe, in general, an Intellectual Property right. German judicature clearly suggest that, although a defence based on a bad faith​[141]​ argument in exercising the IP right is hypothetically available​[142]​, such defence cannot be exercised where there is a duty to pay licensing fees, even if a general right to rely upon an abuse exists​[143]​. Therefore, cases where TPM’s are applied so as to block secondary markets in the absence of a general limitation under copyright, the answer would presumably lie in further differentiating cases where a license fee is payable and where not. Thus, where statute foresees payment of a licensing fee, the public policy underlying the need to print monopolization of secondary markets can be achieved by negotiations, and this includes taking procedural steps​[144]​. 

These issues, again, are outside any dogmatic construction of the TPM rules and depend on a clear perception and allocation of market interests. In the second case, the position is much more intricate, and its assessment requires a precise notion of how copyright law operates in different segments and whether in particular market segments more commercial liberty is needed. However, the answer similarly lies in whether substantive copyright will in future permit third parties offering value added services, in which case no persuasive argument can be made to protect TPM’s under Article 6(2) despite such argument.  Ideally, the rather complex grid of interests then enables a more refined doctrinal construction, preserving a comprehensive synchronicity and accord between TPM rules and substantive law. 

The residual issues are chiefly of a procedural nature. In general, the viewpoint may be taken that self help provides a defence, as was decided in the US decisions referred to were the defendant was able to invoke the decompilation provisions. In European law, the position is undecided. The German BGH held that even where, in a patent infringement case, the claim was to be partially rejected for breach of competition law and a resulting obligation to license was established, no right of self help was to be established. However, in the case of employing copyright limitations, the answer may be different, especially where no statutory obligation for compulsory licensing is foreseen. Given the present uncertainty, it would indeed be only in cases where the decompilation limitation is exercisable that manufacturers of circumvention tolls could more readily rely on not infringing Article 6(2), though again this requires a dogmatic shift from a property to an understanding as a general liability clause. In other cases, the shift would at least allow a declaratory judgment. 

The current formulation of Article 6(2) makes it impossible to achieve that result if interpreted literally. It appears, then, that the only remedy in that situation is a complaint based on competition law. The presence of cases that are not based on competition law, but – as the decompilation rules – are governed under a direct copyright limitation thus remain irresolvable. Again, opening up the system and directing the judicial approach towards more market oriented evaluation will assuage that difficulty.  Indeed, Article 6(2) may – as some cases suggest – give rise to a sole standing action against any activities not in line with the right holders commercial intentions​[145]​.

H.	Conclusion
The consequences of the copyright nexus are, therefore, limited. Copyright and TPM protection cannot co-exist. The nexus argument would permit, if accelerated to a true doctrinal principle, any act of circumvention that would not result in an act violating an exclusive right, and would likewise permit the exercise of certain limitations reflecting freedom of speech values. All this might be achieved by a modicum of dogmatic gymnastics. The extensive notion of temporary copying as introduced in Infopaq, however, clearly prevents this. The overall density and simultaneous ambiguity of EU law – which entails the critical and chilling effects that the responses provided by the Court of Justice have for national jurisdictions and their ability to sustain a meaningful evolution of copyright law – renders any use where a minimum of copyrightable material is present sufficient for triggering Article 6. The idea of a copyright nexus, at least in Europe, is obsolete. The effect is to accelerate the subversive force of a general ‘use right’ applicable to all information digitally stored, based not on the factual exclusionary power that comes with digitization but on the existence of a legal norm protecting technology . By that, the ‘electric fence’ argument is re-enforced, permitting absolute control over any potnetial use, and arguably safeguarding that prerogative even where a TPM is not applied. In short, Article 6 - as a norm informed by copyright - reverses the traditional normative hierarchy. 

The intricacies surrounding TPM protection are, of course, not limited to copyright. They affect the much more general debate on whether, and to what extent, private actors should be able to exercise control over information, whether or not such information is protected by copyright. Given the practical effects of Article 6(2) as a potentially absolute normative prohibition, however, the copyright nexus tenet remains a hollow promise. It may, indeed,   thwart a clearer perception of how the manifold interests affected by digitisation can in future be balanced​[146]​. The allocation of a control right that disallows, broadly, the availability of circumvention means results in a complete shift in the legal value system. In truth, what legitimises such control right is principally an interest in the protection of a volatile business model​[147]​: Article 6(2) reflects principally a public policy programme, as a norm that – principally in the case of online business models – aims to prevent an eventual behaviour that has adverse effects on the incentive to invest.  

The copyright topoi are traditionally self-referential. In other words, it is not the task of TPM’s in general to prevent copying but to regulate the behaviour of third parties through normatively safeguarded rules that can be exercised against technology.  Much, then, depends on identifying these interests and the consequential systematisation of legal rules where such interests should be regulated. TPM’s contain a self-executing code that makes a binary choice between two options - access or exclusion. It leaves, for being code, no room for legal rule making, and that programme is then transferred to a normative level that disregards commercial and personality-rights based functions of why information requires protection. 

Recognising an initial free-riding element as primary point attachment may allow further diversifications based on whether the permission of circumvention technologies jeopardises that general incentive to invest in value added services. As a general principle underscoring the spirit of Article 6(2), it seems sensible to introduce a rough test based on whether specific acts initially covered under Article 6(2) would undermine that programme and infuse a general disincentive. This depends on the relationship between the degree of investment undertaken and the degree to which the specific act undermines and devalues that effort. The key consideration is whether a sensible person world have, in the absence of legal TPM protection, taken such risk. Ultimately, the act must therefore devalue the interest in the market. Hence, the manufacture and targeted distribution of circumvention software that allow access to a cost intensive online service is clearly recognisable as an act of free-riding, which in turn requires the formulation of principles of whether such free-riding should be permissible or not.. 

At the other end of the spectrum, a commercially sensible test focussing on market interests would allow differentiations even in cases where tools rendering straightforward copy control mechanisms inoperable are being distributed, because the effective impact on the right holder’s commercial position may be coupled with considerations on the gravity of the offending activity. For instance, it is highly debatable whether selling software that was legitimately purchased on an individual basis truly affects the right holder’s position and his legitimate interest in a significant manner​[148]​. A further positive effect of such test is that it more effortlessly permits distinctions where TPM’s are used to segregate markets and extend control to after markets. US judicature concerning the application of TPM’s in after markets​[149]​ unequivocally uncovered the practical need to place emphasis on balancing such market interests​[150]​.  There remains, necessarily, a limit to that approach. In many cases, circumvention tools may be used for legitimate purposes or not. Whether this is the case can hardly be anticipated at the stage of evaluating Article 6(2), and whether such technology is ‘primarily’ deemed to allow infringement of copyright will in many cases result in prohibitive decisions, especially where such software is mass-marketed. In such situation, clarity is needed, and such clarity can only be achieved when taking into account the precise purpose. On this is settled, nothing would speak against permitting the manufacture of individual circumvention tools for non-infringing purposes. 

The legitimacy of a general prohibition on acts of private circumvention, therefore, is doubtful. There will be very few occasions where indeed consumers may avail themselves of the required tools. From a policy perspective, much speaks in favour of re-addressing the issue of whether Article 6(1) should be maintained. Practically, the norm has little relevance. Its significance lies, as noted, in creating a normative hierarchy leading to over-conceptualisation. Purging Article 6(1) from copyright law has a clear advantage in signalling that public domain concerns in the relationship between right holder and end user still constitute the decisive element of copyright law, and that the programme of decision making remains a matter of the legal rather than technical code. It would further provide a clearer perspective on the character of Article 6(2) that leaves courts with a workable margin of appreciation. 

Overall, TPM protection must then be calibrated to reflect a workable underlying rationale, emphasising technology neutrality and offering a framework allowing the law to develop.  That framework must be equipped for incorporating, incrementally, aspects of communication freedom, and here developments in constitutional theory will be of assistance​[151]​. Affording legal control to a mechanism that technologically decides on inclusion or exclusion raises the very important question of how communication freedom interacts with technology where the legal rule is simply self-executing​[152]​. A TPM cannot make a legal choice because it can not moderate; it only has the same ultimate effect​[153]​ as a normative rule, in the sense that the result is always binary. The conflict between freedom of communication and general ‘right’ in information always requires balancing, and for this sound doctrine is required​[154]​. Claiming such rights in the ‘real world is no different from asserting such rights against an electric fence, because the consequences on an assumed right of access are identical. The fundamental conflict problem thus emerges at the very stage of defining how, not if, the law can progress towards re-inserting rules into copyright. This is because the rationale for TPM protection cannot be derived from copyright protection, and where this is attempted, courts struggle and take recourse to principles and dogmatic constructions that are arbitrary and unfounded. Providing a workable rationale - specifically against acts of disseminating circumvention tools -  therefore often requires some dogmatic reassurance by reference to principles external to copyright law, and necessarily these are deduced from general tort law​[155]​. 

In addition, detecting a ‘basic norm’ of copyright to which all decision making can programmatically revert to is becoming, irrespective of whether such norm is grounded in economic efficiency arguments or romantic authorship notions, increasingly impossible. The multiplication of actors claiming legitimate rights in the use of information illustrates that efficiency arguments become incessantly nebulous. Phenomena like open source software systems already reveal that production, dissemination and consumption of information is not solely the domain of economic efficiency. In addition, regulatory complexities certainly go beyond a distinction based on two social sub-systems (such as a ‘commercial’ and a more ideational system to which normative rules are applied) which may more effortlessly be regulated by creating normative collision clauses​[156]​. The additional problem of conflicting market interests is still an open issue. Given the dynamics and the increased multiplication of legitimate interests in digitisation, it is likewise apparent that such system must rely on competing solutions, and that it must be accepted that the formulation of principles on which copyright policy rests is a result of legal evolution. Normativity depends on recognising structural changes between the legal and social sub-systems to which the law is to apply​[157]​, and these sub-systems are multiplying. Binary choices that distinguish between market-based efficiency arguments, coupled with an assumption that protection prevents market failure, and – more or less – effortlessly recognisable sub-systems such as in open source licensing or attempts to single out certain socially desirable uses in the domain of fair uses​[158]​ cannot comprehensively internalise the dynamics of digitisation and the resulting  multiplication of justifiable interests. Where the interaction between law and constantly changing realities – market based or not – is neglected, formulating axiomatic principles is increasingly futile​[159]​.   
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